This work discusses the process of price formation for electrical energy within an auction-like trading environment. Calculating optimal bid strategies of power producers by equilibrium arguments, we obtain the corresponding electricity price and estimate its tail behavior.
Introduction
The introduction of competitive wholesale electricity market is a key aspect of liberalization of energy production and trading, which recently have been effected around the world. Up to now, all experiences with deregulated electricity markets show that the electricity trading incorporates high risk resulting from volatile and 'spiky' prices. This issue is intrinsic to electricity as a flow commodity, which can not be economically stored. In our approach, we examine by equilibrium arguments an economical mechanism effecting price peaks. Let us mention some related work. In [2] , the author exposes questions of electricity pricing and explains that the non-storability requires a modeling of electricity production process. The economical mechanism of one-period-ahead price formation is discussed in [1] , and in a different context in [3] . The concept of equilibrium asset pricing is widely used by economists, see, for example, [6] , [4] and the references therein. A survey on the theory of auctions is found in [5] .
Since electrical energy is not economically storable, a deregulated electricity market is different from the usual commodity markets. In general, it includes two parts: the real-time market for contracts on immediate production and the electricity exchange for those on future delivery of electricity. While the electricity exchange is similar to the usual forward market, the trading rules at the real-time market are designed to continously match demand and supply to maintain network electrical equilibrium. This requirement is preformed by auction-like trading subjected to several technical restrictions.
Let us simplify the methods for price settlement applied at the real-time markets to explain two procedures: the pay-as-bid (PAB) and the systemmarginal price (SMP) auctions. They work as follows: Each electricity producer submits for each hour of the next day his schedules consisting of a bid quantity and a bid price for power which he is willing to sell at least at this price. The system operator arranges the bids for each hour in the increasing price order. The system price set for the current hour equals to the bid price of the last generator needed to meet the demand. Those producers who are in merit (i.e. whose bid price was below or equal to the system price) supply power and obtain a payment. Other producers suffer a loss since they have to pay fixed costs for their idle production units. For the PAB-auction, each producer who is in merit obtains his own bid price, while for the SMP-auction he obtains the system price. In this work, we restrict ourselves to the PAB-auction.
Denote by Q the electricity demand within one hour and agree that Q is a non-negative random variable on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) such that
We suppose that the distribution F of Q is known to all producers.
Let us denote by J ⊆ [0, ∞[ the set of all bid prices which are acceptable by the system operator. Note that J may be a proper subset of [0, ∞[ due to a possible price cap and/or discrete price levels. After all producer have submitted their schedules, the system operator determines the production capacity I(p) installed at the price p ∈ J summing up all amounts of bids with bid price less or equal p. The non-decreasing right-continuous installed capacity I : J → [0, ∞[ is saturated for an additional producer, if he is indifferent about doing nothing or renting a small production unit and submitting his order at arbitrary price p ∈ J . The idea here that in the real market, the installed capacity must always be saturated since on the contrary some additional producers will install capacities until the saturation is reached. Let us make this concept more precise.
The equilibrium
Denote by c > 0 (MWh) the capacity amount of a small rentable production unit with full production costs p f v = p f + p v , where p f > 0 (USD/MWh) are fixed and p v > 0 (USD/MWh) are variable costs. Then, for installed capacity I , the income of the additional producer depends on his strategy to rent the capacity and to submit a schedule at the price p ∈ J which yields a random gain
or to be idle which gives a non-random gain of zero: G I (idle) = 0. Suppose that the risk aversion of the additional producer is described by the strictly increasing concave utility function U ∈ C(R), giving the utility functional U I which evaluates his strategies by
for the case if a schedule is submitted and 
Intuitively, this definitions says that for saturated installed capacity, the best strategy is to be idle, since either the price is to low to cover the production costs or there is already a sufficient amount of installed capacity.
Given the installed capacity I , the system price p S depends on demand and is set by the system operator as explained above by
with the usual agreement p S (ω) := sup J if {p ∈ J : I(p) ≥ Q(ω)} is empty.
Let us use the following notations
to calculate the system price for the saturated installed capacity (ii) For saturated installed capacity I from (i), the system price p S from (4) satisfies
Proof. (i) We show that the formula (7) indeed defines a saturated installed capacity. First, we point out that I(p) > 0 holds for for p ∈ J if and only if p > p f v : The if-part holds since U is strictly monotonic increasing
which implies I(p) > 0 since F −1 is strictly increasing on [0, ∞[ with F −1 (0) = 0. The only-if-part follows from the definition of I : let p ∈ J , then I(p) > 0 implies p > p f v . Now we shall see that the Definition 1 in fact applies to (7) . If I(p) = 0 then p ≤ p f v as shown above hence
equals to U (0) by the definition of I .
Let us show the uniqueness. Suppose thatĨ is some saturated installed capacity andp
which contradicts (3). Now suppose thatp ∈]p f v , ∞[∩J , thenĨ(p) > 0 since otherwiseĨ(p) = 0 and we would obtain
which is equivalently rewritten as
Hence,Ĩ coincides with I from (7) giving the uniqueness.
(ii) In the case Q(ω) ≥ sup p∈J I(p) we obtain p S (ω) = sup J by definition. Since the second statement should hold for almost all ω ∈ {Q < sup p∈J I(p)}, it suffices to prove it for all ω with 0 < Q(ω) < sup p∈J I(p) due to P (Q = 0) = 0. By definition (4) and from the right-continuity of I , we deduce that
The positivity I(p S (ω)) > 0 from (10) yields
.
Applying the non-decreasing function F to (10) and to (11) we obtain (12)
(13)
This inequality implies
finishing the proof.
System price distribution
The assertion (ii) from the previous proposition allows an interpretation of the system price distribution. An interesting feature here is that tail behavior p → P (p S > p) admits an estimation from below which does not involve the distribution of Q. This shows that the PAB-auction procedure will produce system prices with a 'fat tail'-distribution. To give a precise statement, we need Proposition 2. With notations from above holds: (i) {ρ < sup J} = {Q < sup p∈J I(p)} holds almost surely.
(ii) If p ≤ sup J then ρ ≥ p implies that p S ≥ p almost surely. (iii) For each p ≤ sup J , the probability that the system price p S reaches or exceeds the price p is estimated from below by
Proof. (i) Again, since the statement is to show almost surely, we suppose Q(ω) > 0. From the definition of ρ, it follows that ρ(ω) > p f v , hence
).
Using the definition of ρ, we verify
which gives with the previous equation 
and we have for p ∈ [p f v , sup J] to calculate the probability of the event
which does not depend on the distribution of Q since F (Q) is uniformly distributed on ]0, 1[. In other words, we can use the formula
for all y ∈ [0, ∞[, and the proof is completed by concluding for each p
The estimation (14) shows that the tail p → P (p S ≥ p) of the system price distribution decreases rather slow. A ranging of the system price distribution to a class of known 'fat tail'-distributions seems not possible at this level of generality, since the distribution depends heavily on the set J and on the utility function U , furthermore, we have to take into account and the size of production costs. The impact of the risk aversion is hard to evaluate exactly since in a real market the utility function is not observed explicitely. Since that, let us mention a rough quantitative estimation of the tail decrease which applies for each utility function and involves merely the production costs.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions of the Proposition 2 for
Proof. For each h > 0 the concavity of U yields U (h) ≤ U (0) + h(U (0) − U (−cp f ))(cp f ) −1 . Subtracting U (−cp f ) on both sides, we obtain
This inequality is used to estimate
The assertion follows by replacing h = cp − cp f v and using of (iii) from the last proposition.
